manually.
There Another virtually mandatory statement is that the numan, for all his putative flexibility, is not so good at the monitoring task and is highly likely to miss critical signals, as well as to makeoccasional commissive errors.
Indeed, the verity of the second statement, supported by endless accident and incident reports, tempts designers to "automate humanerror out of the system." The lure is especially great in aviation, where the cost of humanfailure can be so catastrophic.
Although the authors have no quarrel with the two basic statements, the assumption that automation can eliminate humanerror must be questioned. This paper will explore automation of flight-deck functions, the presumed benefits and possible pitfalls, and will ask whether it is possible that cockpit automation may have already passed its point of optimality. As in other industries, a large componentof airline operating costs is l_bor. Although it is questionable whether automation can reduce the number of persons in the cockpit (the authors do not wish to plunge into the two-versus-three person crew controversy at this time), it is a possibility that should not be totally discounted (O'Lone 1980) . Furthermore, automation may reduce direct labor costs somewhat by reducing flight times through more efficient l_;teral navigation, and may cut maintenance costs by more effective use of the equipment. In considering economics, however, one must also recognize that automation equipment is expensive. The airline industry will incur enormouscapital costs to acquire the equipment, as well as operating costs for training and maintenance. But even putting the safety question aside and looking only at the economics, it appears at this time that flight-deck automation should be a very good investment, especially in view of continuing fuel price increases and possible shortages.
Representative aviation accidents and incidents
So much for the promises of f]|ght-deck automation. Let us now examine someof the problems, which can best be illustrated by representative aviation accidents and incidents.
These accounts are confined, by necessity, to very brief summaries and commentson what is usually a very complex causative chain. Wedo not wish to oversimplify either the facts or the causative interp-'etations of these accidents, and the interested reader is encouraged to read the full reports.
For other examples, see Rolfe 1972 , Danaher 1980 , and Wiener 1977 and 1980 3. ii.
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